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We propose a model of behavior regulation in trust-based interaction dilemmas and test the predicted 
experience of 20 emotional components of this model reported by 90 participants. According to this 
model, new information about trust-based interaction outcomes triggers specific emotions that jointly 
recalibrate the operation of relevant  behavior  regulation  programs  in  self and/or others. With this 
recalibrational  system  in  mind,  we  propose  adaptive  design  features  shared  among  six  sets  of  20 
emotions  to  produce  a  functional  taxonomy  of  emotions  –  with  sets  triggered  according  to  the 
computed identification of adaptive problems. Unlike Valence Models that predict reports of large sets 
of emotions according to interdependent positive and negative affect alone, the Recalibrational Model 
predicts and finds evidence of mixed-affect emotional states. We discuss the implications of having 
conflicted minds for both scientific and well-being pursuits. 
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The central aim of this paper is to investigate whether emotions, reported by participants after 
completing a “Trust game” (based on Berg, Dickhaut, & McCabe 1995, hereafter BDM) and learning 
of its outcome, were experienced in a patterned way and whether results conform to predictions of our 
proposed “Recalibrational Model” or predictions of positive and negative affect Valence Models. We 
propose an emotionally calibrated model of behavior regulation in trust-based interaction dilemmas 
(the “Recalibrational Model”) and a functional taxonomy of emotions (elaborated in subsections 1.1. 
through 1.3. below) that predict the experience of 20 individual emotions reported by 90 participants 
according to information about game outcomes. 
The first part of the proposed model (1.1) describes how the relative calibration of short-sighted 
and long-sighted behavior regulation programs ultimately determines Investor and Trustee behavior 
when individuals are confronted with Trust game choice dilemmas. The second part of the model (1.2) 
specifies how emotions, acting jointly in sets to recalibrate the operation of relevant behavior 
regulation programs in both self and others, are triggered by new information about Trust game 
outcomes. The third part of the model (1.3) proposes how the above sets of emotions computationally 
identify the presence of specific adaptive problems based on Trust game decisions and outcomes. A 
fourth part of this model, untested with this research, specifies the kinds of targeted recalibrational 
effects (i.e., “positive” upregulation and/or “negative” downregulation) that we expect emotions to 
produce (on specific behavior regulation programs: short-sighted or long-sighted) in self and others 
(see Table 1 for details). 
The multivariate recalibrational functions proposed for the 20 emotions studied determine the 
functional fit of specific emotions into six unique sets within this model. Our multivariate model 
predicts the experience of emotions better than more intuitive models still de riguer today
1, such as the 
bipolar affect Valence Model where positive emotions or negative emotions are experienced as 
interdependent negatively correlated opposites (e.g., see Lang et al. 1993; Ortony, Clore, & Collins 
1988; Russell & Carroll 1999). 
We observe reports of mixed-valence emotional states (e.g. strong simultaneous experience of 
triumph & guilt) consistent with competition between cognitive programs within humans‟ “conflicted 
                                                 
1 While many researchers have long moved past the bipolar affect models, instead recognizing that positive and negative 
affect are at times independent dimensions (e.g., see Watson, Clark, & Tellegen 1988), psychophysiologists (Driscoll, 
Tranel, & Anderson 2009; Lang, Greenwald, Bradley, & Hamm 1993) neuroscientists (Proverbio, Zani, & Adorni 2008; 
Screenivas, Boehm, & Linden 2012) behavioral economists (Morretti & di Pellegrino 2010; Brandts, Riedl, & van Winden 
2009; Van den Berg, Dewitte, & Warlop 2008; Morris 1995) and decision scientists (Hogarth, Portell, Cuxart, & Kolev 
2011; Reid & Gonzalez-Vallejo 2009; Schlosser, Dunning, & Fetchenhauer 2011) continue to use bipolar affect scales 
(specifically, the Self-Assessment-Manikin valence scale developed by Lang (1980)). 2 
 
minds”. We provide further evidence for the patterned experience of multivariate sets of emotions, 
supporting the theory that sets of recalibrational emotions are triggered in patterned response to the 
adaptive problems produced by trust-based interactions. 
 
1.1. Trust-Based Decision Dilemmas and Behavior Regulation by Short-
Sighted and Long-Sighted Programs 
When one is confronted with a dilemma, there is some sort of internal conflict over how to 
pursue alternative desired outcomes that cannot be simultaneously fulfilled at their maxima. We study 
such a dilemma modeled by the BDM Trust game where an Investor first decides how much of a $10 
endowment to send a paired Trustee, en route the sent amount is tripled – becoming the “income”, and 
then the Trustee decides how much of the income to return to the Investor. In this trust-based 
interaction the Investor must decide whether to pursue his short-term goal of securing immediate and 
certain material gains – maximally achieved by keeping his endowment, or else to pursue his long-term 
goal of developing a trust-based exchange relationship – maximally achieved by investing his 
endowment in the Trustee stranger (demonstrating trust) and then recouping his loss when the Trustee 
fulfills the implicit expectation of returning a value in excess of the investment. Likewise, the Trustee, 
having received a multiplied transfer of funds from the Investor, must decide whether to pursue her 
short-term goal of immediately securing material gains by keeping this income, or else she can pursue 
her long-term goal of developing a trust-based exchange relationship
2 by transferring back an amount 
greater than what the Investor originally transferred and thereby demonstrating her trustworthiness. 
Reciprocity theories predict that demonstrations of trust and trustworthiness, and the results of trust-
based interactions affect the relative valuations of short-term and long-term goals that people pursue. 
Our model proposes that the adaptive problems, modeled by the Trust game, are regulated by 
short-sighted and long-sighted programs
3 (e.g., see Carrillo 1998; Kurzban 2010) in conflict with one 
another (Livnat & Pippenger 2006). The relative calibrations of these two programs regulate 
                                                 
2 While we study a single, anonymous interaction, our evolved psychology errs to caution by processing information about 
one-shot interactions under the premise that they may in fact be repeated in the future (e.g. see Delton et al., 2011). 
We also suspect that Investors who make trust-based choices discover consequent effects on their payoffs and extend this 
information in constructing generalizable models about the trustworthiness of Trustees in the population (e.g., the 
experimental subject pool). 
3 “Programs”, from computational science, refers to neural circuits in the brain/body which process input information and 
accordingly  cause  outputs  either  in  the  form  of  regulatory  variables  and  feedback  (reused  as  input  by  programs)  or 
behavior.  3 
 
individuals‟ behavior
4 in dilemmas such as trust-based interactions (see Figure 1). Outside of the 
artifices of a laboratory, individuals may rely on alternative behavioral strategies (e.g. threats of 
violence, sexual seduction) for coercing transfers from those they interact with, and while we prohibit 
these forms of personal interaction, we acknowledge that calibrations of individuals‟ behavior 
regulation programs during trust games might be affected, a priori, by their strategic inclinations in less 
restrictive contexts.  
 
1.2. Recalibrational Functions of Emotions and Prediction of Emotional 
Experience 
Based on the various types of emotion functions described below, we propose a functional 
classification system that categorizes the 20 emotions studied (see Table 1) according to constellations 
of their shared features. This classification system allows us to not only identify the positive and 
negative affect valence of emotions that recalibrate the behavior regulation programs, but also to 
identify which behavior regulation programs they serve, and whether the behavior regulation programs 
that they target are in self or other. The functional features that we conjecture emotions to have are 
“recalibrational”, as we describe below. 
 Nesse (2004, p.1138) states that, while emotions have been selected for because of their ability 
to solve specific adaptive problems, “...there is no one to one correspondence between an emotion and 
a function. One emotion can serve multiple functions, and one function may be served by several 
different emotions.” Consistent with Nesse, our functional classification of 20 emotions yields six sets 
containing multiple emotions that we expect to be triggered in concert for common functional 
purposes. We characterize these functions as positive or negative recalibrations, targeting short- and 
long-sighted programs, intra and inter personally. 
Generally, an adaptationist and functional perspective of emotions argues that emotions 
facilitate behavioral regulation because they provide either positive or negative feedback (experienced 
as pleasant and unpleasant feelings) that is used in updating the calibration of one‟s internal regulatory 
variables (e.g., Cosmides & Tooby 2000; Buck 1999; Tooby & Cosmides 1990). Pleasant feelings 
(e.g., from happiness, contentment, pride, cheerfulness) are rewarding and can incentivize approach 
behavior and continuation of the prior behavior or interaction that triggered them (Watson et al., 1999; 
Carver & Scheier 1990). Unpleasant feelings (e.g., from sadness, aggravation, guilt, disgust, anger) are 
                                                 
4 While we expect individual differences in degree (i.e., variance in relative strengths of regulatory programs or emotions), 
we do not expect differences in kind (i.e.., direction of calibrational effects), since we take the existence of these programs 
to be species-typical adaptations. 4 
 
costly and motivate a change, whether through behavior reduction, avoidance, or aggression (Gray 
1971).  
  Of our set of 20 emotional states, we conjecture 9 [appreciative, happy, content, cheerful, 
triumphant, inspired, secure, proud, believable] that are positive, 1 [surprise] that could be either 
positive OR negative (in a unique set by itself: set 4), and 10 [disgusted, jealous, aggravated, 
frustrated, angry, depressed, sad, embarrassed, ashamed, guilty] that are negative. 
Perhaps the binary division into positive and negative affect types is the simplest of these 
taxonomies of emotions (Tellegen, Watson, & Clark 1999). Several theoreticians have argued that by 
moving beyond the more simplistic models of valence (or positive and negative affect) to models of 
emotions with additional features of functional design-specificity, we might gain even greater 
explanatory power of how emotions affect behavior (Lerner & Keltner 2000, 2001; Van Kleef, de 
Dreu, & Manstead 2004). In considering the nature of adaptive decision problems encountered in trust-
based interactions, we recognize that the outcomes of these decisions are contingent on not only self-
behavior (according to the calibration of one‟s own behavior regulation programs), but also the actions 
of others (according to the calibration of their programs). As such, it is helpful to consider a typology 
of these adaptive problems in terms of their solutions: specifically, solutions arrived at via 
intrapersonal and/or interpersonal behavior regulation (e.g., see Levenson 1999; Van Kleef et al., 2004; 
Butt, Choi, & Jaeger 2005). Below we discuss the distinction between intrapersonal emotions that may 
affect reinforcement, maintenance, or change of self-behavior, and interpersonal emotions that may 
ultimately affect reinforcement, maintenance, or change of another‟s behavior. 
Of our set of 20 emotional states, we conjecture 15 [appreciative, happy, content, cheerful, 
triumphant, inspired, secure, surprised, disgusted, jealous, aggravated, frustrated, angry, depressed, 
sad] that serve both short-sighted and long-sighted adaptive goals, and 5 [proud, believable, 
embarrassed, ashamed, guilty] that exclusively serve long-sighted adaptive goals (split into 2 unique 
sets, one positive: set 3; and one negative: set 6). 
Emotions are ultimately designed to deal with the adaptive problem of program orchestration 
(Tooby & Cosmides 1990) that arises by the simultaneous activation of competing behavior regulation 
programs within an individual‟s mind. To solve this adaptive problem, triggered emotions have been 
designed by natural selection to recruit the assistance of a number of psychological, physiological, and 
behavioral processes that are best suited for affecting a recalibration of targeted programs. When one‟s 
prior actions did not succeed in achieving an adaptive goal, negative emotions are triggered to 
recalibrate regulatory programs in the self. For example, guilt, an intrapersonal emotion triggered 
exclusively in response to a failure by the long-sighted program, recalibrates (i.e., downregulating) the 5 
 
dominant short-sighted program within one‟s self so as to effectively increase the value of delayed 
payoffs relative to immediate payoffs. As the incentive to pursue short-term payoffs decreases in 
magnitude (as a function of guilt felt), the costs of forgone long-term rewards looms larger in our 
minds. As a result, we increase our valuation of long-term goals and therefore our ability to “commit” 
to their pursuit (Frank 1988). On the other hand, when one‟s prior actions succeed in achieving an 
adaptive goal, positive emotions are triggered and recalibrate regulatory programs in the self to ensure 
further achievements. For example, the experience of feeling believable and proud occurs when 
positive emotions are triggered by the decision to engage in cooperative behavior. These positive 
intrapersonal emotions upregulate the long-sighted program (relative to the short-sighted program) so 
as to further encourage the behavior that led to successful cooperation. 
Several theorists including moral philosophers (Hume 1740; Smith 1759), moral psychologists 
(Kohlberg 1971; Haidt 2003; Ketelaar 2006) evolutionary biologists (Darwin 1872; Trivers 1971; 
Nesse 1990), and economists (Hirschleifer 1987; Frank 1988) have identified a set of emotions among 
humans designed to commit one towards or reinforce socially appropriate behavior or recalibrate self 
and others towards socially desirable behavior. We conjecture that while most (19/20) emotional states 
of our set have intrapersonal recalibrational functions, seven of these [triumphant, inspired, secure, 
proud, believable, surprised, guilty] are exclusively intrapersonal (not also serving interpersonal 
recalibrational functions). 
Another way that emotions are designed to function is by regulating another‟s programs in an 
effort to affect how that person will interact with one‟s self. For example, consider the gratitude 
emotion. Discovery that another has foregone short-term rewards in the pursuit of a long-term 
exchange relationship with one‟s self – for example by providing assistance, presents a fortunate 
opportunity but one that must be acknowledged, lest it appear that the goodwill relationship initiated 
by the other is taken for granted by self and not reciprocated in kind. If one is unprepared to 
reciprocate in some welcomed form directly after receiving a benefit, how can one signal or 
demonstrate willingness to reward the other? Evolutionary psychologists have suggested that gratitude 
and appreciation are emotions designed for this adaptive problem (Tooby & Cosmides 2008). 
Experimental evidence supports this functional account of feeling grateful and appreciative (Tesser, 
Gatewood, & Driver 1968; Algoe, Haidt, & Gable 2008; McCullough et al., 2001). 
Of our set of 20, we conjecture 1 emotional state [appreciative] that is exclusively interpersonal 
(in a unique set by itself: set 1), positive, and serves both short-sighted and long-sighted adaptive 
goals. We conjecture there to be 6 more positive emotional states serving both short-sighted and long-6 
 
sighted adaptive goals, but that are not exclusively interpersonal [happy, content, cheerful, triumphant, 
inspired, secure] and form another unique set by themselves: set 2. 
A few emotions are designed to regulate dual targets: particular programs within one's self, and 
particular programs in others. Shame and embarrassment are emotions that may dually serve both self-
directed and other-directed purposes. Generally speaking, the shared adaptive goal of shame and 
embarrassment is for one to preempt another‟s targeted inter-personal regulation of one's self by, 
instead, initiating self-imposed regulations with the functional equivalence of regulations that the other 
party might otherwise impose. For example, shame could preempt a disgust reaction in another if it 
preemptively leads to distancing one's self from the other, or alternatively, shame could preempt anger 
in another if it preemptively imposes costs on one's self. Likewise, the appeasement function of 
embarrassment may act remedially, effectively preempting the social conflict and aggression outputs 
from others, for example, when others experience anger as a consequence of one‟s rule violations 
(Keltner, Young, & Buswell 1997; de Jong 1999). This class of dually intrapersonal and interpersonal 
emotions is unique in that, when triggered, it recalibrates a targeted program within the self and in 
doing so preempts a recalibrational process that the interpersonal emotions (e.g., anger) of others 
would be motivated to affect. 
We next describe the design of our natural experiment and state predictions derived from the 
theory that potentially competing behavior regulation programs, each evolved to pursue a specific 
adaptive goal, recruit superordinate emotion programs to calibrate self and/or other, so as to optimize 
the pursuit of adaptive goals. 
  Of our set of 20 emotional states, we conjecture that 12 are both intrapersonal and 
interpersonal, with the seven [disgusted, jealous, aggravated, frustrated, angry, depressed, sad] 
negative states considered to serve both short-sighted and long-sighted adaptive goals forming a 
unique set (set 5). 
 
1.3.  Computation  of  Adaptive  Problems  Triggering  Recalibrational 
Emotions 
  Our recalibrational theory of emotions is built around conflicting short-sighted and long-
sighted behavior regulation programs, whose relative calibrations determine an individual‟s choices 
when faced with decision dilemmas, such as in the Trust game. We propose that the emotions serving 
these programs computationally assess game outcomes for the purpose of identifying and reacting to 
successes and failures of the short-sighted and long-sighted programs (in self and other). Because these 7 
 
successes and failures (from the perspective of an individual‟s short-term and long-term goals) may be 
attributed to one‟s own behavior, to the interaction partner‟s behavior, or to both persons‟ behaviors, 
the problem source must be computationally identified and the appropriate emotions for recalibrating 
these targeted programs must be triggered. According to our model, emotions computationally identify 
the trust game outcomes that trigger them. We label these triggers A, B, C and D. 
For illustration, we describe below how each of the A, B, C, and D triggers can be computed 
based on Trust game decisions and interactions, and how these triggers are hypothesized to affect 
emotion responses. For the complete specifications of emotions according to triggers produced by the 
Trust game, see Table 1 where the additive combinations of triggers (derived from the computational 
model illustrated in Figure 1) contributing to predicted experiences of emotion sets 1-6 are detailed for 
Investor and Trustee. This combined functional framework of emotional experience (represented in 
Table 1 and Figure 1) has been constructed based on postulated adaptive functions of the defined 
emotions and the nature of the adaptive problems presented by Trust game outcomes. 
The “A” trigger measures the amount that the Trustee‟s return, R, exceeds the Investor‟s 
investment, S. When “A” is strongest the Trustee has transferred-back the greatest amount of the 
Investor‟s invested endowment possible. The “A” trigger quantifies the Trustee‟s reciprocal behavior 
by providing a measure of the amount of invested endowment that is returned in a Trust game 
interaction. A computational identification of “A” triggers proud and believable emotions experienced 
by the Trustee that upregulate her long-sighted program, while the simultaneous triggering of 
aggravated, frustrated, and depressed emotions experienced by the Trustee serve to downregulate her 
competing long-sighted program. Likewise, “A” will trigger emotion experiences in the Investor. For 
example, “A” triggers the Investor to feel appreciative, an emotion that targets the Trustee, 
upregulating her long-sighted program. 
The “B” trigger measures the amount that Investor‟s investment, S, exceeds Trustee‟s return, R. 
When “B” is strongest the Trustee has returned nothing and opportunistically kept the greatest amount 
of the Investor‟s invested endowment possible. While the strength of “B” is limited by the amount of 
endowment invested, it quantifies the amount of opportunistic behavior demonstrated by the Trustee 
who does not return enough to restitute the loss of endowment invested in the Trust game interaction. 
A computational identification of “B” triggers guilty, ashamed and embarrassed emotions experienced 
by the Trustee that downregulate her short-sighted program. Likewise, “B” triggers the Investor to feel 
angry and aggravated, downregulating his long-sighted program. 
The “C” trigger measures the fraction of the endowment kept by the Investor. When “C” is 
strongest the Investor has demonstrated no trust, invested nothing, and kept the greatest portion of his 8 
 
endowment possible. A computational identification of “C” – produced entirely by the Investor‟s 
decision to not invest endowment in the Trust game – triggers guilty, ashamed and embarrassed 
emotions experienced by the Trustee that downregulate her short-sighted program. Likewise, “C” 
triggers the Investor to feel disgusted and frustrated, downregulating his long-sighted program. 
Last, the “D” trigger measures the fraction of the multiplied transfer (or income) kept by the 
Trustee. When “D” is strongest the Trustee has transferred-back nothing and opportunistically kept the 
greatest amount of income possible. Computationally, “D” identifies the amount of available 
opportunism achieved by measuring the proportion of available income that a Trustee decides to keep 
in a Trust game. A computational identification of “D” triggers a negative surprise reaction by the 
Investor who expected monetary gains from returns on his investments. From the perspective of the 
Trustee‟s short-sighted program, a strong “D” corresponds to an unexpected, but seized, “opportunity”. 
“D” triggers happiness, appreciation, and positive surprise emotions for the Trustee, in turn, 
upregulating the long-sighted program in the Investor that produced the opportunity in the first place. 
  In summary, emotions are triggered by computational assessments of short- and long-sighted 
programs‟ successes and failures. When these problems that they are variably designed to address are 
present, emotions are triggered (experienced). According to their design functions, triggered emotions 
either contribute to the reinforcement of successes or the reduction of failures by upregulating or 
downregulating either short- or long-sighted programs in the self or other. We test whether 
constellations of specific antecedents (the A, B, C, and D triggers produced by Trust game interaction; 
see Figure 1) reliably predict specific emotion responses. 
 
2. Design, Predictions and Procedures 
2.1. Natural Experiment Design 
We conducted a BDM Trust game in which the Investor received an endowment of $10 and 
could send any unkept portion of it to the Trustee, with the amount sent tripled. The Trustee then 
decided how much of the tripled investment, or income, to return (or else keep). Following the Trust 
game we administered a 20-item emotional status survey
5 in which participants reported how much 
                                                 
5 To avoid experimenter demand effects that might result by soliciting reports on only a few select emotional states 
commonly ascribed to failed trust-based interactions (i.e. anger and guilt) and identified in the literature (e.g., Ketelaar & 
Au 2003), we constructed a survey of a large array of emotional experience, based on the Positive and Negative Affect 
Scale (PANAS), a 20-item self-report measure of positive and negative affect states developed by Watson et al. (1988) that 
has been demonstrated across a large non-clinical sample to be a reliable and valid measure of these states (Crawford & 
Henry 2004). 9 
 
they felt each of 20 emotions (on a 5 point scale labeled (1) very slightly or not at all, (2) a little, (3) 
moderately, (4) quite a bit, (5) extremely) as a consequence of their recent game interactions and 
outcomes. Using this laboratory implementation of the Trust game, which engages participants in one-
shot anonymous economic interactions, and a well-established emotional status survey we investigated 
whether emotions were triggered and reported experienced in a patterned and predicted way as a 
consequence of game outcomes. 
 
2.2. Predictions 
Inspired by functional theories of social emotions (Trivers 1981; Cosmides & Tooby 1989), 
Nesse (1990, p.275; 1999, p.458) made various predictions about how specific emotions mediating 
reciprocity would be triggered by the four types of interaction patterns produced by a repeated 
Prisoner‟s Dilemma game. To our knowledge Nesse‟s predictions have not yet been tested. This paper 
takes a similar natural experiment approach and examines the relationship between participants‟ 
endogenous generation of Trust game outcomes and consequential reports of emotion. Like the 
Prisoner‟s Dilemma, the Trust game is another model for reciprocity, albeit a model of asynchronous 
(rather than synchronous) trust-based exchange.  
With the set of predictions below, generated by Valence Models and our Recalibrational 
Model, we test assumptions and compare how well different models of emotional experience predict 
the emotions reported by participants who had just completed Trust games.  
 
Valence Models 
P1: In the three versions of Valence Models (predicted in P1.1-P1.3 below, respectively) 
emotions show positive correlation within each of two sets: a Positive Affect (PA) set and 
a Negative Affect (NA) set.  
P1.1: PA & NA sets are independent: no correlation (=0) is expected between them.  
P1.2: PA & NA sets are strictly interdependent with negative (=-1) correlation between 
them. Consistent with a purely “bipolar” model of valence, reports of simultaneously 
experienced strong positive emotion and strong negative emotion are unexpected. 
P1.3: Interdependence is unrestricted between emotions in the PA & the NA. While 
negative correlation is expected between sets, positive correlation between items in PA & 
NA sets can also occur.  




P2: Conflicted minds produce mixed emotions: at times involving positive correlation 
between (simultaneously experience) PA & NA emotions.  
P3: Emotion experiences are reported in a patterned way according to a multivariate set 
of shared recalibrational features (i.e., positive and/or negative recalibrational effects, 
targeting short- and/or long-sighted programs, intra and/or interpersonally).  
P4: A set of four adaptive problem features (triggers), computed from Trust game 
interactions, predicts the experience of emotions in the 6 sets of the Recalibration model 
better than the 2 sets of the Valence models. 
 
2.3. Experimental Procedures 
The experiment, programmed using z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007), was conducted at Chapman 
University‟s Economic Science Institute. Participants were recruited from a campus-wide subject pool 
consisting primarily of undergraduate students.  
There were four experimental sessions, each lasting approximately thirty-five minutes. The 
average amount earned was $10.31, plus $7 for arriving to the experiment on time and participating. 
No participant participated more than once. Each session had between 18 and 24 participants, seated in 
individual cubicles, and was conducted as follows. An experimenter read the instructions explaining 
experimental procedures and payoffs aloud while each participant followed along with their own copy 
of the instructions. After finishing the instructions, participants were given five minutes to privately 
write down their answers to several quiz questions. After participants completed the quiz, the 
experimenter distributed a printed copy of the correct quiz answers. To ensure understanding, any 
remaining questions were answered in private. 
 Participants, randomly assigned to one of two roles: “person 1” (Investor) or “person 2” 
(Trustee), interacted anonymously in the computerized Trust game over a local computer network, 
then completed the 20 item survey in which they reported the status of various emotions consequent on 
their decisions, game interactions, and resulting outcomes. 
 
3. Results 
In this section, we report general results of the Trust game and the emotional status survey, then 
in section 3.1 we investigate evidence for shared features between emotions: how the patterned 
experience of emotions accords with the various assumptions of the Valence Models and our 11 
 
Recalibrational Model. In section 3.2 we examine the full models of emotional experiences according 
to four triggers (based on computation of adaptive problems consequent of economic decisions and 
interactions), comparing the fit of the unrestricted Valence Model and the Recalibrational Model. 
We find no significant differences between the four sessions and report the joint results of all 
90 participants. Figure 2 displays the scatter plot of the amount sent and the amount sent back. There is 
substantial variability in individual behavior. On average, Investors sent $5.31 (SD=3.68) and received 
$5.34 (SD=6.00) back from the Trustees, resulting in profits of $10.04 and $10.57, respectively. These 
results are consistent with previous findings of BDM. Likewise, there is substantial variability in 
individual reports of emotional experience. While the modal report for most (17/20) emotions was 1=, 
“very slightly or not at all”, modes were also seen at 3 (for happy and content) and 5 (for appreciative). 
The average emotion was reported experienced as mean=2.2075 (median= 1.85, SD=1.303) near “a 
little” (=2) as a result of Trust game interactions. Ratings on every emotion ranged from 1 (very 
slightly or not at all) to 5 (extremely). 
 
3.1 Shared Features of Emotions 
Valence Models assume two factors, one comprised of a standard set of positive emotions that 
positively correlate with one another [appreciative, happy, content, cheerful, triumphant, inspired, 
secure, proud, believable, and surprised] and the other comprised of a standard set of negative 
emotions that positively correlate with one another [disgusted, jealous, aggravated, frustrated, angry, 
depressed, sad, embarrassed, ashamed, and guilty]
 6. Consistent with P1, item analysis indicates that 
all positive emotions positively correlate with one another (all of 45 correlations) and most, but not all, 
negative emotions positively correlate with one another (40/45 correlations). Guilty positively 
correlates with only 5 of 9 other negative emotions and negatively correlates with only 6 of 10 positive 
emotions, most notably showing a strong positive correlation with triumphant (0.184; p=0.041) –
consistent with P1.3 and P2. 
In further support of P1.3 and P2, cross tabulation, indicates occurrences of simultaneously 
experienced PA & NA emotions. We observe a total of 41 cases (0.5%) from 7 respondents reporting 
PA & NA emotions that are (both) felt “extremely” (=5); 123 (1.4%) cases from 16 respondents 
reporting PA & NA emotions that are (both) felt in the range from “quite a bit” to “extremely” (≥4); 
601 (6.7%) cases from 41 (45.6%) respondents reporting PA & NA emotions that are (both) felt in the 
                                                 
6 These “standard” sets are based on the PANAS (e.g., Watson et al. 1988).  12 
 
range from “moderately” to “extremely” (≥3); and 1456 cases (16.2%) from 60 (90%) respondents 
reporting PA & NA emotions that are (both) felt in the range from “a little” to “extremely” (≥2). 
We use Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA)
7 to measure how well our data on reported 
emotional experience fits the three Valence Models, each assuming positive correlation within sets of 
positive and negative emotions, but each with a differing assumption concerning the relationships 
between the experience of positive and negative emotions. In all valence models we constrain each 
emotion to load onto only one of the two factors but not onto the other. Thus, the valence models differ 
only in the constraints they impose on the factor correlations. Model 1 constrains the factors to have a 
zero correlation (where positive emotions bear no relationship with negative emotions), Model 2 
constrains the positive and negative factors to a correlation of negative one (as would be appropriate if 
emotional state existed purely on a bipolar continuum), and Model 3 imposes no restrictions on the 
factors‟ correlation.  
An examination of model 1 and model 2 fit informs us whether positively and negatively 
valenced emotion sets are better described as experienced independently or experienced dependently. 
By comparing the fit of Model 3 to that of Models 1 and 2, we can further address the adequacy of 
describing the experience of these valenced sets with restricted versus unrestricted factor solutions. 
Summaries of the three models are shown in Table 2. The lesser Bayesian Information Criteria, 
(BIC) and greater log-likelihood (LL) make it apparent that Model 1 has fit superior to Model 2, 
however Model 3 has fit superior to Model 1 (X
2(1) = 29, p-value < .001), consistent with P1.3. In 
model 3 the correlation between positive and negative factors is -.72 and significantly different from 
zero (p-value < 0.001 and 95% confidence interval of [-.833, -.616]). 
We use CFA to evaluate the fit of twenty emotions into the six functional sets derived from our 
Recalibrational Model. We describe this derived fit as “Model R”. Model R predicts the patterned 
experience of emotions according to the six factors corresponding to the Recalibrational Model‟s sets 
listed in Table 1. Consistent with P3, all emotions loaded positively and significantly onto Model R at 
a 1% level.
8 With a greater LL and lesser BIC, Model R has a superior fit to the unrestricted Valence 
Model 3 (X
2(14) = 125, p-value < 0.001).  
 
3.2. Comparison of Structural Equation Model Fit 
                                                 
7 We use Stata version 12.1 and the `confa‟ procedure by Kolenikov (2009). Our results are robust to those obtained using 
the `sem‟ procedure (Structural Equations Model) yielding the same log-likelihood fit and similar measures of fit. Either set 
of results produces the same ranking where Model R fits best, followed by Model 3, then Model 1 and last Model 2. Results 
available upon request.  
8 While not reported here, results including between factor correlations are available upon request. 13 
 
We use Structural Equation modeling to compare the fit of our Recalibrational Model to the 
unrestricted Valence Model. The models are illustrated in Online Appendix 1 where subfigures (a) and 
(b) illustrate our six factor model while subfigures (c) and (d) illustrate the unrestrained valence model. 
To compare these models we test both with triggers A, B, C and D, as computed from game 
interactions. Results of both exercises are shown in Table 4. Given we did not find support for either 
perfect independence or interdependence in section 3.1, we do not restrict correlations and allow all 
latent factors to freely correlate in both models
9. As predictions differ for Investor and Trustee, 
separate analysis is performed for each role. Where more factors tend to produce better fit, all-things-
equal, we report the BIC, which penalizes for added variables. We report the difference between 
models, assessing whether the better fit is statistically significant despite the difference in factors seen 
in Table 4.  
As with CFA, we find superior results for the Recalibrational Model, consistent with P4. 
Despite penalizing for additional fitted variables, the difference is significant (computed using X
2(Δ) = 
β, where Δ is the difference in the degrees of freedom between the competing models, and β is the 
difference in log-likelihood).
10 
In the Recalibration Model, 15 of 18 of the triggers‟ coefficients are significant below the 5% 
level, whereas in the bipolar valence model only 4 of 16 of the trigger‟s coefficients are significant (see 
Table 4). We find all the individual emotions‟ coefficients significant below the 5% level in the 
Recalibration Model, whereas in the Valence Model we find 10 of 19 individual emotions‟ coefficients 
significant (below 5%) for the Investor and 8 of 20 individual emotions‟ coefficients significant for the 
Trustee (see Online Appendix 1).  
 
4. Discussion 
We consider our mapping of situational predictors of emotions and their orchestrated triggering 
of emotions (according to shared recalibrational features) a success. Using confirmatory factor analysis 
to assess latent sets, or structural equation models to assess triggers on latent sets we demonstrate that 
our Recalibrational Model predicts the experience of 20 predicted emotional states (specifically, six 
latent sets of these) following the Trust game better than the Valence Model. Below we discuss two 
                                                 
9 Given that all between factor correlations are significant for the unrestricted Valence Model, but not for the 
Recalibrational Model, this choice should bias against the Recalibrational Model being superior via fit measures that 
penalize for additional variables. 
10 We also find superior fit when comparing our Recalibrational Model to the Valence Model as predicted by amounts sent 
and returned (S and R) instead of the computed triggers (A, B, C, D). For brevity we do not report results of the Valence 
Model as predicted by S and R here. Results are available upon request.  14 
 
potential sources of our currently unexplained variance, consider future directions for further exploring 
the predicted effects of recalibrational emotions, and suggest some implications of having conflicted 
minds for both scientific and well-being pursuits.  
We consider two potential classes of explanations for currently unexplained variation in how 
strongly emotional experiences are rated by participants: first, that participants either have imperfect 
access to their emotional states or the fidelity of their reports is compromised, and second, that 
frequency dependent selection maintains different types in the population, and some of these types 
(e.g. psychopaths) do not experience certain emotions (e.g. guilt) as do others. 
People who are asked to rate single emotions may not be able to accurately describe their 
emotional states (Ellsworth & Tong 2006) if emotion experiences are more often and accurately 
described with multiple words (Izard 1977), or with different words among different people. While we 
acknowledge that the limitations of language could present problems for our research, the precedent of 
previous research successful at relating the experience and impact of self-reported emotions in 
conjunction with experimental games (Ketelaar & Au 2003) gave us encouragement in pursuing 
measures of self-reported emotions following an economic game. 
Another obvious issue is that participants may make biased
11 or untruthful reports. 
Experimental economists are particularly concerned that participants “will not „tell the truth‟ unless 
incentives make truth telling compatible with maximizing utility” (Lopes 1994, p.218). According to a 
metareview by Camerer & Hogarth (1999) there is no clear evidence that additional financial 
incentives would improve the quality of responses in a simple survey task like ours. In fact, it has been 
noted that for short tasks like our emotions survey that people are known to voluntarily complete 
without problem (because they have sufficient intrinsic motivation to do so), an attempt at increasing 
participation via financial incentives often “backfires” with counter-intentional effects (e.g., see 
Mellstrom & Johannesson 2008). Nevertheless, wary of the possibility that participants may have been 
incentivized to use efficiency tactics to complete the survey (such as marking all responses with the 
same value –an expedient technique for clicking through the survey), we reviewed our data and found 
not a single apparent case of such behavior. 
                                                 
11 Ekman (1999) shows evidence of culture-specific under-expression of experienced negative emotions, while 
Kotchemidova (2005) shows evidence of culture-specific over-expression of experienced positive emotions. To ascertain 
whether participants biased reporting of positive emotions relative to negative emotions, we examine the constants terms 
from the structural equation models. Comparing constants for reported positive vs. reported negative emotions, we observe 
higher values for positive emotions (using a Median Test, p < 0.01 for Trustee and Investor), which could result from either 
or both of the noted cultural biases. If homogeneous, this bias should not result in unexplained variance as the models allow 
fitted constants for reported emotions or emotion sets. If heterogeneous, our lack of identifying information would prevent 
us from controlling for the role of culture. 15 
 
Frequency dependent selection can produce relatively stable mixed types in a population (e.g., 
see Lomborg 1996), a phenomenon that might contribute to individual variation in emotional reports 
(Ketelaar 2004; Mealey 1995). For example, sociopaths who do not respond to remedial social gestures 
and likely lack the “moral” emotions that serve the long-sighted program‟s goal (e.g., see King-Cases 
et al., 2008), comprise about 5% of the adult population (Mealey 1995). As Mealey (1995, p.124) 
stated, we suspect that “as long as evolutionary pressures for emotions as reliable communication and 
commitment devices leading to long-term cooperative strategies coexist with counter pressures for 
cheating, deceptions, and „rational‟ short-term selfishness, a mixture of phenotypes will result, such 
that some sort of statistical equilibrium will be approached”. We are unable to account for individual 
variation in types that exist in our sample. 
Explanations of how our psychological and behavioral systems function can be distinguished as 
either proximate (how and when a mechanism does what it does) or ultimate (what the mechanism has 
been selected to do). While we have developed theory of emotions‟ ultimate function and derived our 
predictions of antecedents from it, this study only tests the proposed functioning (i.e. the triggering) of 
emotions‟ proximately. Future studies can take our Recalibrational Model one step further and test for 
ultimate functions by examining whether the future actions of those individuals who report emotions 
under the predicted conditions are affected as theory predicts. Three studies which we know of have 
taken this approach to testing ultimate functions already: Ketelaar & Au (2003) who demonstrated how 
the experience of guilt leads to choices of cooperation over opportunism, Fehr & Gachter (2002) who 
demonstrated that angry individuals are more likely to engage in costly punishment, and Dunn & 
Schweitzer (2005) who have shown that Investor happiness and gratitude increase trust in the Trust 
game. 
It may be that the current literature has disproportionately focused on anger and guilt because 
they are among the more reliably predictable emotions to be experienced consequent of cooperative or 
uncooperative game interactions. According to individual regressions (detailed in Online Appendix 2) 
anger was the best predicted post-game emotion among our Investors (p<0.001, R
2=0.61) and guilt was 
one of the best-predicted post-game emotions among our Trustees (p<0.001, R
2=0.55). For Trustees, 
the emotional states happy, appreciative, and content were predicted as successfully as guilt. We are 
optimistic that, for these emotion experiences especially, the proposed recalibrational functions would 
be demonstrated if their effects were examined in subsequent Trust games. 
Normative accounts of decision making (e.g., von Neumann & Morgenstern 1944) argue that 
rational agents should pursue the best alternative by comparing costs and benefits of all outcomes. If 
decision makers had perfect information for forecasting others‟ behavior and always made the best 16 
 
choices by accurately evaluating all possible cost-benefit tradeoffs, there would be little value to ex-
post emotional feedback. It is rarely the case that we have enough information, mental resources, or 
time to evaluate all outcomes when presented with a decision task (Simon 1987; Todd 2001, Mellers et 
al., 2001). In fact, when facing a decision under uncertainty, the resulting outcome of a decision may 
be unknown and quite relative. We have proposed that recalibrational emotions are triggered when 
decision outcomes are finally realized. As such, the ex-post feedback that emotions provide, and their 
ability to recalibrate both self and other to improve conditions, contributes to the experience-based 
learning and recalibration process that is useful when taking advantage of opportunities in uncertain 
environments. Without the ability to update our behavior regulation programs based on this feedback, 
we might repeatedly set ourselves up for failure where a more appropriate (and economically viable) 
strategy could be substituted. 
Divorced from their application, emotions do not appear to be cognitive tools, but instead may 
appear as flaws of human nature that interfere with rationality (Sherer 1984; Elster 1995). However, 
when known dilemmas are re-encountered and the effects of emotional experience that they previously 
triggered are integrated into a decision calculus (e.g., Ketelaar & Au 2003), we see evidence for the 
specially designed recalibrational functions of emotions.  
While the experience of mixed emotions has been discussed by others (Cacciopo, Gardner, & 
Berntson 1999) and evoked with wins and losses in the laboratory (Larsen, McGraw, & Cacciopo 
2001; Larsen et al., 2004), as well as by trust-based interaction in our study, it is not well appreciated 
as a core trait of human nature, and may appear as a flaw of human nature that interferes with 
rationality (Sherer 1984; Elster 1995). Many experimentalists continue to work with assumptions and 
methodological tools supposing that valenced emotional states can accurately be represented on a bi-
polar spectrum, or that such a representation is sufficient to accurately capture behavioral effects of 
emotional states. Our study cautions against assuming that explanatory power of the Valence Model is 
sufficient and suggests that more complex multivariate models, such as the Recalibrational Model, 
better track the triggered experience of mixed emotions and subsequent behaviors. 
In light of our model, we have identified the mechanics that would need to be engineered to 
produce an emotional equilibrium between partners: a condition in which the emotional impact of 
partners‟ behavior on each other and on themselves is one in which all engaged programs are kept in 
the same relative state (before and after action). An important implication of this stable equilibrium is 
that even under such conditions, the mind is expected to remain conflicted. A proscription that might 
be derived from such a consideration is that a steady emotional state might be more closely approached 17 
 
in so far as one is prepared to properly anticipate the experience of both positive and negative 
emotions; a “conflicted mind” is not a fluke, but a normal predictable condition. 
The experience of mixed emotions may not be regarded as a reliable steady state because it 
challenges our intuitions of a “self‟s” singular internal interests and the consonance of a non-
contradictory self-representation generally attributed to a sane mind. Kurzban (2010, p.56) suggests, 
“if it‟s true that your brain consists of many, many little modules with various functions, and if only a 
small number of them are conscious, then there might not be any particular reason to consider some of 
them to be “you” or “really you” or your “self”... And for that matter, there might be no particular 
reason to consider your intuitions about your choices, or your ability to know your “self” reliably.” 
While the implications of a modular recalibrational theory of emotions might be existentially and even 
epistemologically difficult to grapple with, we extend the following practical implications for mental 
health professionals and laypeople alike. 
Psychotherapists often treat patients who complain of and suffer from emotional states – and it 
is not uncommon for patients that patronize these professionals to seek an escape from unwelcomed 
negative emotions (e.g., Nesse 1991, 2000). Treatment of these emotions, whether through behavioral 
intervention or psycho-pharmaceutical treatment, may benefit from the degree to which psychologists, 
psychiatrists, and counselors are (1) informed of the functional uniqueness and similarities 
distinguishing the emotions and their taxonomic classifications, and (2) informed of the choice 
dilemmas and post-decision situations from which emotional experiences precipitate. Our 
Recalibrational Model suggests that it is not optimal for wellbeing pursuits to aspire for a purely 
“positive” emotional state via complete transcendence or removal of “negative” emotional states – in 
fact, such a pursuit could be harmful. Life entails suffering and happiness because both positive and 
negative emotional states serve their functions, recalibrating our own inner-workings as well as the 
inner-workings of those that we interact with. Given the uncertain future, we need to constantly engage 
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Table 1. Specific Classifying Features of Emotions with Predicted Emotion Triggers and Emotion Targets  
Set  Emotion 
Adaptive 
Goal 
Recalibration  I‟s Emotion Trigger & 
Target 
T‟s Emotion Trigger & 
Target  Pos  Neg  Intra Inter 
U  V  A  B  C  D  A  B  C  D 
1  Appreciative  X  X  X      X  T
UPos        I
UPos      I
UPos 
2  Happy  X  X  X    X  X  I
UPos 
T
UPos    I
VPos    I
UPos 
T




2  Content  X  X  X    X  X  I
UPos 
T
UPos    I
VPos    I
UPos 
T




2  Cheerful  X  X  X    X  X  I
UPos 
T
UPos    I
VPos    I
UPos 
T




2  Triumphant  X  X  X    X    I
UPos    I
VPos    T
UPos      T
VPos 
2  Inspired  X  X  X    X    I
UPos    I
VPos    T
UPos      T
VPos 
2  Secure  X  X  X    X    I
UPos    I
VPos    T
UPos      T
VPos 
3  Proud  X    X    X    I
UPos        T
UPos       
3  Believable  X    X    X            T
UPos       
4  Surprised  X  X  X  X  X          I
U,VNeg  T
UPos    T
U,VNeg  T
VPos 
5  Disgusted  X  X    X  X  X    I
UNeg 
T
VNeg      T
UNeg    I
VNeg   
5  Jealous  X  X    X  X  X    I
UNeg 
T
VNeg      T
UNeg    I
VNeg   
5  Aggravated  X  X    X  X  X    I
UNeg 
T
VNeg      T
UNeg    I
VNeg   
5  Frustrated  X  X    X  X  X    I
UNeg 
T
VNeg      T
UNeg    I
VNeg   
5  Angry  X  X    X  X  X    I
UNeg 
T
VNeg      T
UNeg    I
VNeg   
5  Depressed  X  X    X  X  X    I
UNeg 
T
VNeg      T
UNeg    I
VNeg   
5  Sad  X  X    X  X  X    I
UNeg 
T
VNeg      T
UNeg    I
VNeg   
6  Embarrassed  X      X  X  X      I
VNeg 
T
UNeg      I
UNeg 
T
VNeg     
6  Ashamed  X      X  X  X      I
VNeg 
T
UNeg      I
UNeg 
T
VNeg     
6  Guilty  X      X  X        I
VNeg      T
VNeg     
Note: X‟s indicate classifying features of emotions; cells populated under A, B, C, D triggers indicate targets of Investor‟s or Trustee‟s emotion (I= 
Investor‟s; T= Trustee‟s; 
U = long-sighted program 
V = short-sighted program) and Pos (=upregulation) or Neg (=downregulation) denoting the 
direction of targeted recalibration.  
 
 
Table 2. Details of Confirmatory Factor Analyses 






1  Independent Valence Model - Zero PA/NA Correlation  5,121  170  -2,470 
2  Bipolar Valence Model – Negative (-1) PA/NA Correlation  5,298  170  -2,559 
3  Unrestricted Valence Model – Unrestricted PA/NA Correlation  5,067  169  -2,441 
R  6 Factor Recalibrational Model  5,060  155  -2,366 
 
Table 3: Details of Structural Equation Fit Analyses 
  Recalibration Model  Valence Model   
 
Log-





likelihood  df 
Bayesian 
Information 
Criteria  Difference 
Investor  -1,246,04  76  2,773.38  -1,286.39   66  2,824.03  p < 0.001 
Trustee  -1,264.81   84  2,849.38  -1,416.53   69  3,095.71  p < 0.001 
 
Table 4: Structural Loadings for Unrestricted Recalibrational and Valence Models 
Investor    Trustee 
  A  B  C  D    A  B  C  D 
Recalibrational Model 
L1  0.315***          0.527***      1.334** 
  (0.101)          (0.096)       (0.669)  
L2  0.522***    1.536***      0.461***      1.404**  
  (0.096)    (0.421)      (0.081)       (0.566) 
L3  0.265***          0.586***        
  (0.103)          (0.084)        
L4        1.292**    0.416**    1.076  -0.980  
        (0.556)    (0.191)     (1.045)   (0.904) 
L5    0.327***        0.094     2.257***    
    (0.050)        (0.098)     (0.631)    
L6      1.019***        0.228***     
      (0. 375)        (0.065)     
Valence Model 
PA  0.241**  -0.104  0.242  -0.127    0.086  -0.030  -2.02***  0.806* 
  (0.112)  (0.070)  (0.494)  (0.404)    (0.110)  (0.076)  (0.060)  (0.046) 
NA  -0.008  0.064  0.014  -0.051    -0.371***  0.318***  -2.172***  -0.467 
  (0.019)  (0.057)  (0.090)  (0.087)    (0.114)  (0. 080)  (0.574)  (0.467) 
Note: * indicates statistical significance at p<0.10, ** significant at p<0.05, and *** at p<0.01 
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Note: Each individual has two weights that determine the relative importance of pursuing conflicting 
goals  of  long-term  and  short-term  programs,  respectively,  where  U  ≥  0  and  V  ≥  0  The  weights 
determine individuals behavior via decision function where a higher U weight weakly increases and a 
higher V weight weakly decreases S or R, for the Investor (i) and Trustee (t), respectively. Emotions 
computationally assess adaptive problems that result from game outcomes and identify goal successes 
or failures. The weights are up- and down-regulated by arrays of emotions (ei, et) produced by self (i) 
and other (t)  –  for example, the individual‟s  exchange partner. Thus the weights  are dynamically 
updated after targeting by recalibrational emotions. 35 
 
 
Figure 2. Scatter Plot of the Amount Sent and the Amount Returned. 
 
 
Note: One circle equals one observation. Each „petal‟ of flower-like figure equals one observation. 
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Online Appendix 1: Structural Equation Models for Recalibrational and Bipolar Valence Models 
 
 
Subfigure a: Recalibrational Investor        
 
Subfigure b: Recalibrational Trustee 37 
 
 
Subfigure c: PANA Investor         
 
Subfigure d: PANA Trustee 
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Online Appendix 2: Regression Analysis of Individual Emotions 
Table 1 provides the set of predictions about how interactions based on Trustee and Investor 
behaviors trigger different emotions. We test these predictions applying linear regression analysis 
separately for each emotion. Results of this estimation are shown in Table 5. Each row in the table 
represents a separate emotion as a dependent variable. As independent variables we use the triggers 
predicted by the theory. The first five columns are estimated for Investors and the last five columns are 
estimated for Trustees.  
All emotions of Investor are significantly affected by at least one of the triggers predicted by 
the theory. Specifically, 22 out of 25 triggers are significant and have correct signs. For Trustee, 
emotions are also significantly impacted by the triggers, with 25 out 36 being significant and having 
correct signs. The one emotion that is not well predicted by the theory is “surprised”. This is not 
entirely unexpected, since many theorists (e.g., Ortony et al. 1988; Ortony & Turner 1990) have argued 
that “surprise” may not even qualify as an emotion as it could be either positively or negatively 
valenced – a source of confusion that may also contribute to participants‟ difficulty uniformly 
interpreting this label. 
A simple linear regression analysis in Table 5 shows that the results of the experiment provide 
strong support for our theoretical predictions. It is important to emphasize, however, that simple 
regression analysis performed separately for each emotion does not account for the fact that emotions 
can be triggered simultaneous. As we suggest, sets of emotions can operate jointly as a unified system. 
Therefore, error terms in each linear regression may be correlated. 
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Table 5. Prediction of Individual Emotion Reports by Triggers. 
  Investor    Trustee 
   Triggers      Triggers 
Emotion  A  B  C  D  R-sq    A  B  C  D  R-sq 
Appreciative  4.865***        0.335    5.521***      2.095***  0.468 
  (1.045)            (0.980)      (0.602)   
Happy  0.556***    1.211*    0.367    4.523***      2.065***  0.457 
  (0.126)    (0.675)        (0.862)      (0.530)   
Content  0.547***    1.750**    0.298    5.040***      2.039***  0.536 
  (0.132)    (0.710)        (0.792)      (0.487)   
Cheerful  0.549***    1.284*    0.317    4.502***      1.871***  0.453 
  (0.136)    (0.732)        (0.842)      (0.518)   
Triumphant  0.337**    0.461    0.186    4.174***      1.479**  0.358 
  (0.134)    (0.720)        (0.917)      (0.564)   
Inspired  0.451***    0.0357    0.48    4.499***      0.338  0.418 
  (0.106)    (0.570)        (0.823)      (0.506)   
Secure  0.607***    2.771***    0.343    3.983***      1.071  0.269 
  (0.131)    (0.704)        (1.036)      (0.637)   
Proud  2.920***        0.179    5.871***        0.523 
  (0.955)            (0.855)         
Believable              2.595**        0.126 
              (1.044)         
Surprised        1.004  0.057    0.219    -0.215  -1.507**  0.284 
        (0.620)      (0.169)    (0.901)  (0.714)   
Disgusted    0.362***      0.378    0.00767    2.038***    0.313 
    (0.070)          (0.127)    (0.681)     
Jealous    0.278***      0.297    0.187*    2.221***    0.281 
    (0.065)          (0.111)    (0.596)     
Aggravated    0.398***      0.439    0.137    2.702***    0.44 
    (0.069)          (0.107)    (0.572)     
Frustrated    0.446***      0.457    0.117    3.021***    0.446 
    (0.074)          (0.123)    (0.661)     
Angry    0.436***      0.613    0.0596    2.563***    0.412 
    (0.053)          (0.119)    (0.639)     
Depressed    0.278***      0.317    0.0836    1.763***    0.239 
    (0.062)          (0.111)    (0.597)     
Sad    0.135**      0.107    -0.00615    1.314**    0.203 
    (0.059)          (0.113)    (0.607)     
Embarrassed      1.064**    0.106      0.194**      0.118 
      (0.473)          (0.081)       
Ashamed      0.843**    0.095      0.331***      0.428 
      (0.397)          (0.058)       
Guilty      1.679***    0.273      0.445***      0.550 
      (0.418)          (0.061)       
Note: * indicates statistical significance at p<0.10, ** significant at p<0.05, and *** at p<0.01. Standard errors are in 
parentheses. 
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